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Abstract 
This theory paper presents an analysis of the materialist hypothesis to 
consciousness and its implications for person–organization (P–O) fit. Some 
implications from neuropsychology are also considered. Three implications 
for P–O fit are discussed: (1) how it affects the underpinning theory; (2) how it 
changes our definition of the term; and, (3) how P–O fit is captured. The 
materialist hypothesis reinforces the underpinning theory, but causes a 
redefinition of P–O fit. It suggests that P–O fit should be defined in terms of 
the individual employee’s unconscious physical interaction of internal features 
and environmental stimuli. The review also suggests that researchers need to 
consider using data gathering techniques that capture unconscious dimensions 
of P–O fit. 
 
 
The fit between individuals and their work organisations has been of interest in management 
literature for fifty years yet the meaning of fit and its consequences remain elusive (Pervin, 
1978; Rynes & Gerhart, 1990; Schneider, Kristof-Brown, Smith, & Brent, 1997). Reasons for 
this are manifold, but one, which we examine here, may be the continuing pervasive 
uncertainty in understanding the roles of consciousness and the unconscious brain in shaping 
a person’s fit with their employer. In this paper we examine the consequences for fit of one 
model of consciousness: materialism–epiphenomenalism or monism, which will hereafter 
refer to as materialism. 
The last ten years have brought remarkable developments in brain research and in 
brainscan technology, which are revolutionising our understanding of brain processes 
(Goguen & Forman 1994; Greenfield, 2000). Indeed, consciousness is emerging as an 
important research arena and is being addressed by many disciplines including artificial 
intelligence, cognitive science, computer science, mathematics, medicine, neuroscience, 
pharmacology, philosophy and psychology. This research is already challenging many other 
fields, yet, as Dennett (1993) suggests, “scientists and philosophers may have achieved a 
consensus of sorts in favour of materialism, but […] getting rid of the old dualistic visions is 
harder than contemporary materialists have thought. Finding suitable replacements for the 
traditional dualistic images will require some rather startling adjustments to our habitual ways 
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of thinking, adjustments that will be just as counterintuitive at first to scientists as to lay 
people” (Dennett, 1993: 37). 
It is commonly accepted that our behaviours are largely driven from our conscious 
agency: I think about making a cup of tea. I decide to make a cup of tea. I make a cup of tea. 
Yet the materialist hypothesis, which directly derives from rational materialism and scientific 
method, suggests that consciousness has no role in shaping behaviour. Instead, the hypothesis 
suggests that behaviour is entirely determined by unconscious physical processes in the brain 
and that the experience of thinking about making a decision does not shape the decision in 
any way. This makes the materialist hypothesis extraordinarily counterintuitive. 
This paper considers how materialism might influence our understanding of 
person–organisation fit (P–O fit). The focus on P–O fit is warranted because the theoretical 
underpinnings of the construct (i.e. interactional psychology) lie in the literature on the 
determinants of individual behaviour and the P–O fit literature has not yet directly addressed 
issues of brain and mind. Instead, there appears to be a tacit assumption that consciousness 
has a role to play in shaping behaviour. Moreover, researchers have argued that P–O fit is an 
important factor influencing some key decisions that people make. For example, the decisions 
to join, stay with, and to leave an organisation are all thought to be connected to people’s 
sense of fit (Cable & Judge, 1996; Chatman, 1989; Schneider, 1987). Understanding whether 
or not people make these decisions as conscious agents weighing all the relevant 
considerations, or rather, as the materialist hypothesis suggests, they make these decisions 
unconsciously swept along by physical processes out of their conscious control is worthy of 
further consideration. 
The paper begins with a brief explanation of the key terms ‘brain’, ‘unconscious’, 
‘mind’, and ‘consciousness’ before a summary of the two main hypotheses concerning 
consciousness and a more thorough review of the dominant approach – materialism. The 
paper then considers how adopting a materialist hypothesis to consciousness might change 
our understanding of P–O fit. In particular, the paper focuses on the definition of the 
construct and the methods used to capture people’s P–O fit. 
Consciousness 
Several words and phrases that are used repeatedly in this paper are used in common 
parlance, often with different or multiple meanings. It is necessary to clarify how these words 
– ‘brain’, ‘unconscious’, ‘mind’, and ‘consciousness’ – are used in this paper. 
Some Definitions 
Brain. The brain is the physical location inside the individual in which electrical 
and chemical processes continuously proceed to manage body functions and cognitive 
functions, such as analysis, synthesis, memory and learning, completely outside of awareness. 
It is generally accepted that even with the emergence of brainscan and related technology, we 
are only just beginning to understand the physical workings of the brain. The main 
constituent of the brain is nerve cells called neurons. The neurons form an intricate network 
of unimaginable complexity. Each brain contains about 1011 neurons. Neurons receive 
information through tendrils called dendrites and send the information via ‘terminals’ called 
synapses. Each neuron may have many dendrites and synapses. It has been estimated that 
there might be 1014 synapses in a single brain (Ornstein and Thompson, 1984). The 
information is exchanged between neurons by the movement of chemical particles. It is 
generally accepted that sets of neural connections are associated with particular behaviours. 
Although the neural network is established shortly after birth, the details and fine-tuning of 
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the pathways continue to develop throughout our lives. It is known that experiences can cause 
new synapses to grow (Ornstein and Thompson, 1984), that learning appears to involve 
changes to the network of neurons (Gazzaninga, Ivry & Mangun, 1998), and that the more 
often a part of the network is used, the more likely it is to fire again (ref.). People are unaware 
of these electrical and chemical processes in the brain and in this sense the brain is said to be 
unconscious. 
Unconscious. At its simplest, the term ‘unconscious’ means not being aware of  
signals from the environment, for example, sights and sounds, or signals from the body such 
as pain. In addition, individuals are completely unaware of (i.e. are unconscious of) the neural 
and cognitive processes in the brain. These processes include how experiences are formatted 
into memories, how those formats interact with sense data received from contemporary 
experiences, how the assembly of those formats and brain processes produce the ‘stream of 
consciousness’, and, how behaviour including speech is choreographed. 
Mind. Whereas the brain has physical location, the word ‘mind’ means the non-
physical location of conscious experience. Much is known about how the senses operate and 
how signals travel through the body and into the brain. But how conscious experience is 
generated is still unknown (Churchland, 1986; Crick & Koch, 1990). It is the nature of the 
link between the unconscious brain and the conscious mind that is central to the different 
consciousness hypotheses. 
Consciousness. The term ‘consciousness’ is an ambiguous one. Consciousness can 
mean the state of being awake (e.g. “I am awake and fully conscious”) and the state of 
knowing about something (e.g. “Now that you have told me that, I am conscious of your 
views”). These are accepted uses of the term, but in this paper ‘consciousness’ is taken to 
mean the “subjective quality of experience: what it is like to be a cognitive agent” (Chalmers, 
1996: 6). Used in this sense, explaining the nature of consciousness has troubled thinkers for 
hundreds of years. It is linked to the very essence of life as demonstrated by Descartes’ 
‘cogito, ergo sum’ (I think, therefore I am). Consciousness has, however, always defied full 
explanation (Papineau & Selina, 2000). Some philosophers (e.g. McGinn, 1991; Nagel, 1994) 
have gone so far as to suggest that the whole question of consciousness is too difficult for 
humans to solve. Yet, this being said, consciousness has been defined as the following 
catalogue of experiences: experiences of the senses (visual, auditory, tactile, olfactory and 
taste), pain and other body sensations, mental imagery, emotions, conscious thought and a 
sense of self (Chalmers, 1996). In short, consciousness is that which a person experiences and 
is aware of at any given moment. 
The definition of the term ‘consciousness’ is so vital for understanding what 
follows, that it is worth relating an example to illustrate the point. Chalmers (1996) captures 
the essence of ‘consciousness’ with an explanation of the chain of events that occurs when 
someone plays a note on a piano. “A complex chain of events is set into place. Sound vibrates 
in the air and a wave travels to my ear. The wave is processed and analyzed into frequencies 
inside the ear, and a signal is sent to the auditory cortex. Further processing takes place here: 
isolation of certain aspects of the signal, categorization, and ultimately reaction. All this is 
not so hard to understand in principle. But why should this be accompanied by an 
experience?” (Chalmers, 1996: 5). It is this ‘experience’ that is the essence of consciousness. 
The mind–brain debate 
These definitions hint at the nature of the mind–brain debate that has divided 
philosophers for centuries. On one side of the debate are those people that believe that the 
mind and the brain are separate entities and that there is an interaction between the two. 
According to this ‘dualist’ approach, the conscious mind can and does influence someone’s 
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behaviour. On the other side of the are materialists who believe that the mind cannot  
influence someone’s behaviour. 
The Dualist Hypothesis. The most intuitive hypothesis about the interaction 
between the unconscious brain and the conscious mind is the dualist one. Dualism, 
sometimes termed interactionism, asserts that the brain and mind interact and that 
consciousness influences behaviour (Koestler, 1967; Popper & Eccles, 1977; Velmans, 2000; 
Vendler, 1972, 1984). For instance, I receive a letter from a utility demanding that I pay my 
bill or they will cut me off. I consciously decide to pay the bill by cheque. I write the cheque 
and post it as a result of the decision made in my conscious mind to do so. Implicit in the 
hypothesis is the idea that people consciously make decisions and understand what they are 
doing and why. This hypothesis equates with the way that most people think about the way 
they make decisions (Dennett, 1993). 
The ‘stream of consciousness’ which is the phenomenal experience of being alive, 
with its apparent conscious agency, intent, and decision-making, is supported by the dualist 
hypothesis. Despite these considerations, dualism is rejected by many consciousness 
researchers (Dennett, 1993). This rejection is based on the absence of any satisfactory 
explanation of how the mind, a non-physical entity, can influence physical matter. Without a 
satisfactory explanation, proponents of a dualist hypothesis resort to theories that appear to 
breach the fundamental laws of physics, such as the law of energy conservation, or 
antiscientific explanations of the interaction (Wilson, 1995). 
The Materialist Hypothesis. The antagonist to dualism is materialism. This 
hypothesis derives from the scientific method of determinism and supervenience. It argues 
that every physical event has a set of wholly physical causes that are collectively sufficient to 
explain the occurrence of the event (Lowe 1996). The physical universe comprises materials 
whose states and motions are subject only to ‘natural laws’. The non-physical conscious mind 
alone cannot alter these natural laws, nor intervene to alter events. If this is true for an 
individual’s conscious mind in relation to the world generally, then it must be true for the 
conscious mind in relation to the body, including the brain. If the non-physical mind can 
influence the physical brain, what prevents it influencing other parts of the body, or, indeed, 
other bodies? It follows that the conscious mind is inessential in the processes of the body, 
including the physical processes of the brain (Flanagan, 1992). In essence, this approach 
separates the conscious experience and the unconscious processes and argues that there is 
only one direction of influence between the two entities – from the unconscious brain to the 
conscious mind. The conscious mind is thus said to be epiphenomenal: the ‘stream of 
consciousness’ that is subjective experience follows from brain processes and is not 
functional for behaviour. Conversely, the unconscious processes that occur in the brain are 
physical and therefore they can interact with the body.  
This materialist hypothesis is so counterintuitive that it needs further explanation. 
Think about your thoughts as you read this page of writing. What are you thinking of? What 
emotions do you experience? What are you feeling? According to the materialist hypothesis, 
your conscious experience of reading this page of text follows from your unconscious 
processing. The thoughts you are conscious of having have already been ‘processed’ by your 
unconscious brain (Kornhuber, 1984; Kornhuber & Deecke, 1965). Your desire to put the 
kettle on is not a conscious decision on your part, but a consequence of physical events – 
chemical reactions, electrical impulses, and so forth – that have happened unconsciously in 
your brain. You might find it disturbing to think that you are not a conscious agent in 
anything you do, but it need not be so. You are still the same person who makes the same 
decisions. It is just that your understanding of what role your consciousness plays is different. 
I receive a letter from a utility demanding that I pay my bill or they will cut me off. The data 
(information contained in the content of the letter, the colour of the print, the feel of the 
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paper, etc.) enters the brain through the sense organs (some of which I am made conscious of 
and some of which I am not). Inside my brain, electrical and chemical processes occur that 
use this new data in combination with existing data. Again, some of this data will appear in 
my consciousness, whilst others pieces of the data will not. These might include my 
memories of being cut off previously, my procedural knowledge of writing cheques and 
posting them, my fears of the penalties, my values of social responsibility and right and 
wrong, and my previous experiences of being in debt. Regardless of which of pieces of data 
these flash into my consciousness, all seem likely to play some role in my brain’s outcome to 
direct my behaviours to write the cheque and post it. 
Evidence to support the process of unconscious processing preceding conscious 
thoughts comes from Libet (1999). Under laboratory conditions, he asked subjects to 
undertake a simple flick or flexion of the wrist at a time of their own choosing. He measured 
activity in the brain and recorded the time of the act and when the subject ‘decided’ to flick 
his or her wrist. He found that such voluntary acts are preceded by a specific electrical 
change in the brain – termed the ‘readiness potential’ – half a second or more prior to the 
intention to act becoming conscious. Conscious experience thus appears to occur after the 
relevant unconscious processing. 
A problem inherent in discussing consciousness is that everyday language and 
perceptions of the world are based upon dualism. Even those with a scientific bent in 
essentially deterministic-materialistic writings slip into references to personal conscious 
agency, and people acting from conscious beliefs and conscious values. Yet, according to the 
materialist hypothesis, we must distinguish between conscious intent and conscious decisions 
preceding behaviour, and their being causal for behaviour. Just because people think they 
make decisions consciously and believe that they have conscious control over their actions, 
does not mean they are correct. When asked why people believed for so long that the sun 
went round the earth, according to Claxton (1997), Wittgenstein is reputed to have replied 
‘How would it have looked, if it had looked as if the earth went round the sun?’ Tart (1980) 
emphasises that when phenomena are intimately related to what he terms a ‘consensual 
trance’, how things seem is an unreliable indicator of how things are. The remainder of this 
paper concentrates on the materialist hypothesis and considers how an adoption of it might 
alter our understanding of how people behave in and fit their employing organisations. From 
this point on, therefore, when the discussion refers to persons and people, it assumes that 
those persons and people have mind–brain interactions that obey the materialist hypothesis. 
Behaviour, Experience, Agency and Learning 
This paper now examines the materialist hypothesis as it relates to consciousness in more 
depth. In particular, the discussion focuses around the subjects of behaviour, experience, 
agency, and learning. Understanding how the materialist hypothesis applies in these four 
areas is a prerequisite of the discussion of materialism and P–O fit that follows. 
Behaviour 
Counterintuitive as it is, the materialist hypothesis says that all behaviour is determined by 
the unconscious. In addition and as already explained, integral to the hypothesis is the idea 
that conscious thoughts are also entirely generated from unconscious processes in the brain. 
As we have no way of capturing the unconscious processes in the brain in an interpretable 
way, at present there is no way of knowing for certain whether an individual’s thoughts 
represent a complete picture of the underlying unconscious processes which generated them. 
In relation to the determinants of behaviour, this prevents researchers investigating causation 
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via the conscious expressions of the individuals being studied. How could researchers be sure 
that what enters an individual’s consciousness is an accurate or full representation of the 
underlying processes? Instead, it seems that researchers who examine the causation of 
behaviour must consider the relationship between stated thoughts and observations of 
behaviour. Researchers cannot assume that conscious communications are accurately 
describing the actual underlying cognitive representations (which we call values, beliefs, 
expectations, motivations etc.) which are driving behaviour. Nor can researchers infer the 
inter-relationships of components of the representations from conscious descriptions alone. 
Experience 
While awake, people constantly receive data from which their conscious experience is 
generated. This includes experiences of the external world (e.g. sights and sounds), 
experiences of the internal world, (e.g. fantasy images, recollections, and thoughts), 
experiences of emotions or affect (e.g. anger, pride, and regret), and body sensations (e.g. 
hunger, thirst, and pain) (Chalmers, 1996; Dennett, 1993). People are aware of receiving 
some of this data, but a lot of it is received unconsciously. People are therefore subject to a 
continual stream of conscious and unconscious data. People also send streams of conscious 
data and unconscious data to other people, but are only aware of the former. It is fundamental 
to what follows that it is emphasised that people are not aware, that is, do not experience, of 
all their outgoing data in the same way as they are not aware of all the incoming data. All 
awake people who transact with others are thus giving and receiving continuous feedback, 
but do not consciously notice much of it. This data is received through the medium of the 
sense organs and it travels to the brain (Dixon, 1986; Bornstein & Pittman, 1992). Central to 
the materialist hypothesis is the idea that people are unaware of the processing of data in the 
brain; they are only aware of their conscious experience. However, what enters the mind is a 
function of extant unconscious material (such as memories, values and beliefs), unconscious 
processing, and the sensitivities of the sense organs (Bruce & Green, 1985; Claxton, 1997; 
Gregory 1972). Included in this equation is data that people detect, learn, and use 
unconsciously in intricate ways, but which their conscious deliberate scrutiny cannot detect 
or recall (Lewicki, Hill & Czyzewska, 1992). Indeed, according to this hypothesis, people do 
not know the forms of internal representations or processes which underlay their behaviour. 
These representations include the person’s knowledge, values, beliefs, expectations and 
habitual ways of seeing and understanding the world, repertoire of physical, social and 
cognitive skills, habitual behaviours, and motivational patterns. Consequently, people are 
unable to bring into consciousness the actual neural processes involved in analysing, being 
aware, being creative, communicating, consulting, counselling, criticising, deciding, emoting, 
evaluating, feeling, judging, learning, listening, making sense of experience, prioritising, 
remembering, relating, and other similar processes. What occurs in consciousness can only be 
said to be some unknown function of unconscious processes (Chalmers, 1996; Dennett, 
1993). 
Agency 
People have an undeniable sense of agency. People believe that they can initiate actions and 
events, divert their thoughts, take decisions, explain and justify decisions, and attribute causes 
to events (Heider, 1958). For instance, when a person says, ‘I have taken a decision’, he or 
she thinks that a conscious decision has been made and that it can be enacted at a time of his 
or her own conscious choosing. However, according to the materialist hypothesis, what 
actually has happened is this: data consciously and unconsciously enters the body through the 
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sense organs and is ‘processed’ in the brain. Memories, skills, values, and so forth that are 
coded in electrical and biochemical ways interact with the data via the brain’s physiological 
neural network producing the behaviour. This is a physical process not involving 
consciousness. The materialist hypothesis cannot explain how (and why) people ‘experience’ 
the decision-making process and believe themselves to be active agents, except to say that it 
is a physical process that is yet to be understood. In effect, the materialist hypothesis denies 
that people have agency in the sense that there is a homunculus in the brain making decisions 
(Dalla Barba, 2001). People do not make decisions, consciously or unconsciously. Instead, 
the materialist hypothesis suggests that the brain receives data from the environment. It 
‘processes’ this data through its neural network, where it interacts with the person’s 
procedural and associative memories (Moscovitch, 1992), to produce the action. The fact that 
someone might choose to act in a similar fashion many times with different environmental 
data to give the impression that he or she is acting on a ‘value’ or ‘belief’ is simply a 
reflection of the way the neural network of the individual has grown accustomed to 
processing data. In this way, the person does not make decisions; they might be thought of as 
an organism processing environmental data according to a set of rules that are mostly 
prescribed, but which can change over time. 
Unconscious processing emerges as ‘behaviour’ namely motions of the body, 
social and emotional displays, and all types of communication. Cotterill (1995) says that, 
“despite the richness of its cognitive capabilities, the [human] species has at its disposal only 
one type of external response: activation of appropriate muscles” (Cotterill, 1995, p. 292). In 
essence, the person’s unconscious processing can only influence behaviour by manipulating 
muscles, albeit a great many at one time. For example, consider someone engaged in 
conversation with another person whilst walking. In such circumstances, the person is 
simultaneously involved in the management of many internal body systems, the ambulatory 
process, the construction of fluent language, the production of a continuous stream of 
behaviours (for instance, facial, body and voice-tone and speech-pace signals), the reception 
of a continuous stream of similar signals from one or more people, and internal processing of 
that data. The materialist hypothesis asserts that all this activity is under unconscious control 
only. The incoming and outgoing unconscious and conscious data streams are thus 
influencing the behaviours of the other people involved in the conversation, yet those people 
have no awareness of the unconscious components, and, according to the hypothesis, have no 
conscious control over those behaviours. 
Learning 
Learning and memory are linked concepts. For someone to learn, i.e. to adopt a different 
behaviour when placed in an identical situation, the person must remember what to do and 
how to do it (declarative and procedural memory). The materialist hypothesis holds this 
learning must involve physical processes in the brain. Unfortunately, as with so many 
neurological processes, researchers are still unsure how the brain creates, stores and recalls 
memories (Vallar, 1999). There is some consensus that memories have a permanent structural 
basis in the brain probably in nerve cells (Kesner, Hopkins & Chiba, 1992). The storage of 
memories appears to involve the growth or structural change in synapses and the production 
of proteins (Ornstein and Thompson, 1984). Researchers have found differences between 
short-term memories and established memories. Short-term memories are fragile and easily 
disrupted; whereas established memories appear to be impervious to anything short of brain 
damage (Ornstein and Thompson, 1984; Vallar, 1999). It appears that the brain has to ‘wear 
in or consolidate’ (Ornstein and Thompson, 1984: 139) short-term memories to establish 
them in the structure of the brain. This process of wearing in can be easily disrupted and the 
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memory ‘fades’ if not recalled or ‘used’. Established memories become more permanent and 
more dominant with greater recall suggesting that the neural network gets more attuned to 
operate through this memory procedure. This explains why repetition to habituate behaviours 
is so key in learning environments. 
Foundations of Person–Organisation Fit 
P–O fit is concerned with one aspect of the relationship between an individual and their 
employer; that aspect being the nature of the fit between the two parties. It is an interesting 
area because the fit between the two parties is seen as being an important determinant in 
shaping the behaviour of the employee (Chatman, 1989) and the organisation (Schneider, 
1987; Schneider et al., 1997). The theoretical foundations of P–O fit are to be found in 
interactional psychology (not to be confused with interactionism mentioned earlier) and the 
discussion concerning the determinants of human behaviour. This discussion was dominated 
by two approaches for many years: the trait and the situational approaches. According to the 
trait model, and its precursors the type and psychodynamic models, behaviour is assumed to 
be determined by relatively stable, internal characteristics of the person (Allport, 1937, 1966; 
Block 1978; Staw & Ross 1985; Weiss & Adler 1984). People behave as they do due to 
factors internal to themselves: I talk a lot because I’m an extrovert and she goes jogging 
because she is an energetic person. Conversely, according to the situationist model, factors or 
stimuli in the environment are viewed as the prime determinants of behaviour, following in 
the traditions of Watson and Skinner (Mischel, 1968; Salancik & Pfeiffer, 1977; Skinner, 
1971; Thorndike, 1906). People behave as they do due to factors external to themselves: I 
talk a lot because things need to be said and she goes jogging because her doctor has told her 
to get more exercise. 
Bowers (1973) reviewed the literature and discovered that whilst some behaviour 
is driven by internal and external factors, the interaction of the two sets of factors is a 
stronger determinant. Following Bowers (1973) review, a third school emerged – 
interactional psychology. This perspective postulates that behaviour emerges from an 
indispensable continuous interaction between the person and the situation. Four principles 
underpin this research (Magnusson & Endler, 1977): 
1. Behaviour is determined by a continuous process of interaction 
between the individual and the situation. 
2. The individual is an intentional, active agent in this process. 
3. Cognitive and motivational factors are important in the interaction. 
4. The psychological meaning of the situation to the individual is an 
essential determinant of behaviour. 
These principles are not explicit about the role of consciousness in shaping behaviour, 
although the use of words such as intentional and active appear to infer that people have 
conscious agency. Clearly, intentional, active agency is a characteristic of the dualist 
approach granting, as it does, consciousness the power to shape decisions and actions in 
interaction with situational factors. But, as has already been shown, the materialist hypothesis 
does not accept the idea of conscious agency. Instead, it suggests a physical process in which 
the body interacts with the environment without the active involvement of the mind. 
Interestingly though, whilst the materialist approach rejects the notion of the intentional, 
active agent, it clearly accepts the interaction of person and situation variables within an 
unconscious process within the brain. In simplistic terms, in strong situations where 
behaviour is dictated (Mischel, 1977), the sensory organs take data to the brain for 
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unconscious processing and the brain recognises that particular behaviour is required. In 
weak situations where the individual has much more freedom to determine actions (Mischel, 
1977), the sensory organs take data to the brain for unconscious processing and actions 
emerge based on the neural networks and other biochemical and electrical processes in the 
brain. In both cases there is an interaction between the person and the situation in which they 
find themselves. Hence, it still appears valid to think in terms of internal and external 
variables and their interactions when considering the determinants of behaviour from a 
materialist hypothesis. The complications that arise from the approach concern the difficulty 
identifying the unconscious internal and external variables and the unconscious processes 
associated with the interaction. 
As the underpinning theoretical architecture to P–O fit can accommodate both 
dualist and materialist approaches, researchers have been able to focus on behavioural 
outcomes through measured statistical interaction, rather than on the conscious and 
unconscious processes associated with them. However, Wachtel (1977) suggests a focus on 
these underlying conscious and unconscious processes as these will help us refine our models 
of behaviour and, in addition therefore, our understanding of P–O fit. It is the contention in 
what follows that whilst the theoretical foundations of P–O fit may be unaltered by different 
hypotheses of the mind–brain debate, its definition, capture, measurement, and meaning to 
the individual is not so uninfluenced by the materialist hypothesis. 
Person–Organisation Fit Redefined 
The first area that a materialist hypothesis might inform is our definition of P–O fit. To date, 
researchers have conceptualised P–O fit in diverse ways (Kristof, 1996) and this led to some 
ambiguity in the domain. Kristof (1996) recognised this diversity in the literature and 
produced a definition that groups together research that has investigated the interaction 
between people and organisations. She defined P–O fit as “the compatibility between people 
and organisations that occurs when: (a) at least one entity provides what the other needs 
[complementary fit], or (b) they share fundamental characteristics [supplementary fit], or (c) 
both” (Kristof, 1996: 4-5). This integrative definition does not purport to explain how these 
different conceptualisations combine, just that they fall under the one broad category of 
research that can be labelled as P–O fit. As such, it is a useful starting point to develop a 
definition of P–O fit from a materialist perspective. 
In terms of creating a definition of materialist P–O fit, there are several aspects of 
Kristof’s definition that might not be appropriate to this discussion. The first consideration is 
whether or not there is a need to include both individual and organisational foci in the 
definition. Whilst the integration of these two foci into one definition of the term allows for 
all the research done under the P–O fit banner to be grouped together, the necessary 
complexity of the resulting definition hints that there is a lot going on beneath the surface. 
When P–O fit is viewed from the individual’s perspective it is associated with the 
individual’s behaviour and psychological states and outcomes, just in the same way as when 
we talk about commitment, satisfaction, and other similar constructs. Interestingly, in these 
related domains, there has been no need to include individual and organisational foci in the 
definition of the construct. The interest of third parties such as managers or organisational 
selectors in discovering individual’s fit to an organisation is due to the theoretical (and in 
some cases empirical) association between individual behaviours (e.g. commitment, 
satisfaction, flexibility, contextual performance) and a sense of fit (Bowen, Ledford & 
Nathan, 1991). This form of organisational focus is therefore simply an alternative way of 
viewing the individual foci on P–O fit. An alternative perspective of organisational interest is 
described in the work of Schneider and his colleagues (Schneider, 1987; Schneider, Goldstein 
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& Smith, 1995; Schneider, Smith, Taylor & Fleenor, 1998). These studies are concerned with 
the way in which P–O fit influences the behaviour of organisations, rather that the behaviour 
of individuals. As there is no suggestion that organisations have consciousness (cf. Asch, 
1952; Durkheim, 1938; Nelson & Winter, 1992), this branch of the P–O fit literature is not 
relevant allowing a materialist definition of P–O fit to be couched in individual terms. 
Proposition 1 A materialist definition of person–organisation fit 
has an individual focus. 
The second aspect to be considered relates to the perceptual boundaries of the person. While 
it is widely accepted that organisations exhibit a describable culture (Schein, 1985), and that 
‘sub-cultures’ are discernible in specific locations and within specific groups (Sackmann, 
1992), many aspects – structural, functional, social, political, formal, informal, economic, 
operation of espoused values and so on – vary throughout the organisation. At each specific 
organisational location there exists a specific micro-culture, which is an amalgam of these 
characteristics (Ogbonna & Harris, 1998). The materialist hypothesis invites us to consider 
the uniqueness of the person’s appreciation of the working environment. The person receives 
situational data about the organisational environment through the senses; some of which are 
consciously received and some of which are not consciously received. An unconscious brain 
that has been shaped by its own unique history processes the data in ways that cannot yet be 
fully understood. In addition, the unique data that each person emits (consciously and 
unconsciously) influences others and, in due course, their behaviours and transmitted signals. 
This information, feedback, myths, and impressions of the organisation is thus unique to each 
person and challenges the notion of a single organisational culture. There may be some things 
that most people agree on, but the subtle ways that these enter, are processed in, and 
influence other things within the unconscious brain are specific to the individual. 
Proposition 2 Every person has a unique unconscious 
representation of the environment in which they 
work. 
Proposition 3 On the situational side of the interaction, people can 
only be influenced by factors that have been 
registered through the senses. 
Proposition 4 Aspects of the organisational environment that are 
not registered by the unconscious brain cannot 
influence the person’s behaviour. 
The third aspect of Kristof’s definition of P–O fit to consider concerns its encompassing of 
both complementary and supplementary conceptualisations. Complementary P–O fit is about 
one of the parties (the individual or the organisation) making the other whole (Muchinsky & 
Monahan, 1987). It can take several forms such as needs–supplies or demands–abilities 
(Kristof, 1996) or active–passive relationships (Muchinsky & Monahan, 1987). 
Supplementary P–O fit, on the other hand, is about similarity between individual and 
organisational factors. Many empirical research studies have shown the importance of both 
forms of P–O fit for predicting the behaviour of individuals (e.g. Complementary P–O fit: 
Bowen et al., 1991; Bretz, Ash, & Dreher, 1989; Cable & Judge, 1994; Rynes & Gerhart, 
1990; Turban & Keon, 1993 – Supplementary P–O fit: Bretz & Judge, 1994; Cable & Judge, 
1996; Chatman, 1991; Finegan, 2000; O’Reilly, Chatman, & Caldwell, 1991; Posner, 1992). 
Supplementary studies have tended to concentrate on values (e.g. Cable & Judge, 1996; 
Chatman, 1991), which have been defined by Chatman (1989: 339) as “enduring beliefs 
through which a specific mode of conduct or end-state is personally preferable to its 
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opposite”. Studies in the supplementary P–O fit domain have shown that positive 
relationships between value congruency and outcomes such as job satisfaction and 
commitment values (e.g. Boxx et al., 1991; Cable & Judge, 1996; Chatman, 1991; O’Reilly et 
al., 1991). In addition to the way the person and situation factors are combined, these two 
forms of fit differ in the way that the environment is conceptualised. In supplementary fit, the 
environment is defined by those who inhabit it, whereas in complementary fit, ‘the 
environment is defined apart from its inhabitants’ (Muchinsky & Monahan, 1987, p. 272). 
Muchinsky and Monahan (1987) regard this as the ‘essential difference between the 
complementary and supplementary models’ (p. 272). It is distinction that it separates the two 
forms of fit into relational (supplementary) and transactional (complementary) subdivisions. 
Interestingly though, whilst most studies have concentrated on one form of fit or the other, a 
materialist hypothesis allows researchers to investigate both within the same 
conceptualisation of fit. In circumstances when the unconscious brain can recognise that the 
organisation holds values, norms, goals, systems, or other things that are similar to its own, 
and they have psychological meaning, positive outcomes flow. When the organisation is 
perceived to hold norms, goals, systems, or other things that are congruent with the 
individual, but do not hold much psychological meaning, there will either little or no effect. 
Possibly, there might be a negative influence on outcomes if the unconscious wishes these 
things were replaced with something that did have psychological meaning. As such, when 
thinking about the person, it is possible to reconceptualise supplementary fit in 
complementary fit terms. In other words, the alignment of values (or some other thing such as 
norms, goals, or systems) only affects the unconscious brain when it is something that has 
unconscious psychological meaning for it. The point here is that congruence per se is 
irrelevant to P–O fit unless the person has some form of appreciation (positive or negative) 
towards the congruence. Hence, P–O fit can be defined in complementary terms whilst at the 
same time recognising that there will be many factors that are valued because they align. 
Proposition 5 Complementary and supplementary forms of fit are 
not mutually exclusive. 
Proposition 6 When viewed from a materialist perspective, P–O fit 
is a complementary form of P–O fit. 
The previous discussion prompts us to consider another area of interest. Is it values alone that 
the unconscious brain draws upon when determining psychological meaning? First of all, it is 
necessary to unpack the phrase ‘psychological meaning’ in materialist terms as it implies an 
homunculytic influence. As mentioned earlier, the materialist hypothesis suggests that the 
brain receives data from the environment which it processes through its neural network. The 
brain produces actions and thoughts according to this ‘programming’. If someone behaves in 
a similar fashion many times with different environmental data they may create the 
impression that he or she is acting on a ‘value’ or ‘belief’. Instead, this is simply a reflection 
of the way the neural network of the individual has grown accustomed to processing data. To 
eliminate any homunculytic confusion, from hereon the term ‘psychological meaning’ will be 
replaced by the term ‘neuropsychological meaning’ when such a materialist interpretation is 
meant. 
Chatman (1989) suggests that researchers focus on values. In this much cited 
paper she says, “although many aspects of organizations and people are important in 
determining behavior (e.g., abilities, job requirements, personality characteristics, and 
vocations), a [emphasis added] fundamental and enduring aspect of both organizations and 
people is their values” (Chatman, 1989: 339). This justification has underpinned much 
subsequent work on P–O fit and value congruency including the development of the 
Organizational Culture Profile (OCP: O’Reilly, et al., 1991), which is the most commonly 
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used measure of P–O fit. Interestingly though, Chatman’s own justification for focusing on 
values recognises that values are just one of the fundamental and enduring aspects of people 
that determine behaviour. The materialist hypothesis would concur and take this a stage 
further by saying that we can never hope to understand all of the influences, factors, and 
structures shaping the formation of behaviour by the unconscious brain. It could be 
influenced by any data that the unconscious brain has received that has neuropsychological 
meaning as well as by the internal cognitive processes and structures. 
Proposition 7 On the internal side of the interaction, the factors 
that influence P–O fit will be a constellation of 
values, feelings, emotions, memories, relationships 
and other things that have neuropsychological 
meaning. 
Proposition 8 The constellation of values, feelings, emotions, 
memories, relationships and other things that have 
neuropsychological meaning is unique to the 
person. 
So far this paper has considered the internal and external factors involved in the P–O fit 
interaction. As yet it has not considered the actual interaction itself. Clearly, this is an internal 
interaction in the unconscious brain that consciousness cannot fully understand. Indeed, the 
nature of the interaction is shrouded in mystery. If we think of our own behaviours, who can 
possibly say with any certainty how our own behaviour is determined by current events, our 
values, memories from ten years past, deeply repressed and traumatic events, chemical 
balance, genetic inheritance and the myriad of other factors? The materialist hypothesis 
merely highlights the immense difficulty, if not the impossibility, of understanding the actual 
interaction of internal and external factors within the unconscious brain. Memories and past 
experiences are stored as a vast network of neural pathways. When the environmental data 
enters the brain through the sense organs, it initiates a series of chemical and electrical 
processes. From these processes, behaviour is determined. In this sense, there is an 
interaction between external and internal variables determining behaviour, as proposed by 
interactional psychology. But, according to the materialist hypothesis, the individual is not a 
conscious being making decisions, but a complex organism reacting to the situation in which 
it finds itself. There is no free will; just the dynamic internal ‘programming’ that dictates the 
way the organism interacts with the environment. 
Proposition 9 P–O fit is formed by an unconscious interaction of 
external stimuli and internal ‘programming’. 
One of the foundations of P–O fit is person–environment (P–E) fit. P–E fit has a long history 
in human behaviour research (e.g. Lewin, 1951; Murray, 1938) dating back over one hundred 
years (Kristof-Brown, Jansen & Colbert, 2001). Central to this domain is the idea that human 
behaviour is a function of the interaction between people and the environments in which they 
find themselves (Lewin, 1951). Initially, work in this field examined the fit between the 
individual employee and his or her whole work environment (e.g. Downey, Hellriegel & 
Slocum, 1975; Jahoda, 1961). But researchers found that such a holistic approach to fit 
frustrating as the construct seemed “elusive” (Rynes & Gerhart, 1990: p.14). As mentioned 
above, one stream of work environment fit research has looked at the fit between employees 
and their work culture, which is often expressed as values. Other researchers have focused on 
employees’ fit with their jobs, usually referred to as person–job (P–J) fit (e.g. Edwards, 
1991). Others have considered employees’ fit with their colleagues, which is known as 
person–group (P–G) fit (e.g. Guzzo & Salas, 1995; Klimoski & Jones, 1995). An additional 
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fragmentation of the construct is that researchers have often adopted different definitions of 
the environmental variable within each stream of research. As Kristof-Brown et al. (2001) 
say, “[a]lthough focusing on specific dimensions of fit such as P[–]J or P[–]O fit has enriched 
our understanding of each, it has simultaneously constrained our knowledge of a person’s fit 
with the total work environment” (pp. 3–4). This discussion prompts the question of whether 
these different forms of fit have individual particular meaning to individuals (e.g. individuals 
have an intrinsic need to fit the values of the organisation, individuals have an intrinsic need 
to fit with the personality of group members), or whether they are subdivisions of a more 
generic need to fit. The materialist hypothesis merely reinforces the question and makes us 
realise how little we know about the working of the brain. Do we have a general need to fit 
the environments we inhabit? Do we have a need for embeddedness or integration ‘hard-
wired’ into our brains? Or does the brain make assessments of fit to each aspect of the 
environment that we encounter or are made aware of? If so, how are these fit assessments 
combined and what makes some more important than others? Whatever the answers are to 
these questions, the materialist hypothesis reiterates how vastly complex the experience of fit 
is. 
Capturing Person–Organisation Fit 
Perhaps the area that the materialist hypothesis has most impact upon our understanding of 
P–O fit is in the measures and methods used to capture it. To date, most researchers have 
used methods that elicit values and other dimensions through conscious means. There are 
three published scales or sets of items for the gathering of data on people’s P–O fit. The first 
of these methods is the Comparative Emphasis Scale (CES; Meglino, Ravlin, & Adkins, 
1989; Ravlin & Meglino, 1987). This scale contains 24 pairs of values that respondents are 
forced to choose between. The single-sentence items were written by the researchers to 
describe a specific behaviour relevant to four underpinning values (achievement, helping, 
honesty and fairness). The second published scale is the OCP (O’Reilly et al., 1991). This 
takes the form of a 54-item card Q-sort. Each card contains a value. These values were 
collected from a review of the organisational culture literature. Respondents are asked to sort 
the 54 cards into an order according to how important it is for the value to be a part of their 
employing organisation. The third tool is a development of the OCP by Cable and Judge 
(1996). They reduced the 54 OCP items down to 40 items. Respondents are asked to produce 
the ipsative ranking of the Q-sort on paper, rather than sort cards. All of these measures 
consist of researcher-generated items that constrain the individual. Clearly, from a materialist 
perspective, these cannot capture the full complexity of unconscious processing and must 
produce, at best, a partial impression of a person’s P–O fit. The OCP, for example, just 
contains values that, as has already been shown, are just one group of factors influencing P–O 
fit. 
An alternative method to surface P–O fit is to ask people about their own fit 
(Cable & Judge, 1996; Judge & Cable, 1997; Powell, Lubatkin & Ndiaye, 1997) or the fit of 
another (Kristof-Brown, 2000; Rynes & Gerhart, 1990). The materialist critique of this 
method is clear. The method relies upon the interviewee’s consciousness having an 
understanding of the subject’s (their own or the subject being observed) P–O fit. But 
fundamental to the materialist approach is that the consciousness of people is some 
representation of unconscious processes that is probably partial, selective, and fragmentary. 
Hence, a request for information mediated through consciousness about the fit of the self or 
others will yield partial and potentially misleading data about the actual unconscious sense of 
fit. Instead, the materialist hypothesis holds that the conscious mind can never truly 
understand the unconscious processes of the brain and may not be aware of most things that it 
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does. Consequently, when asking about their P–O fit or the P–O fit of others, people will be 
unable to provide a full and convincing description that equates with the actual processes in 
the unconscious brain. 
Proposition 10 Measurements of fit mediated through conscious 
behaviours will be partial, selective, and 
fragmentary. 
Proposition 11 When asked to describe their fit with their employer, 
individuals will be unable to provide an immediate, 
full, and convincing description. 
Chatman (1989) has raised the issue of whether nomothetic or idiographic approaches should 
be used to capture P–O fit. A nomothetic approach is one that analyses individuals to draw 
conclusions for a group of people. Conversely, an idiographic approach is one that focuses on 
the individual for the purpose of understanding the individual. Underlying the idiographic 
approach is the idea that each person is unique and that generalising across people is 
problematic because, in effect, everyone has different interpretations and understandings of 
every issue under examination (Allport, 1961). The materialist hypothesis pushes us strongly 
in the direction of an idiographic approach as it emphasises the uniqueness of every person’s 
unconscious processing. However, it does not completely eliminate a nomothetic approach, 
as there might be themes that run across people that, although simplified, still resonate and 
create broad categories of factors that influence P–O fit. 
Proposition 12 P–O fit is unique to every person. 
An alternative approach to capture P–O fit is to use methods and techniques that can probe 
the unconscious brain. Kristof-Brown (1997) advocates the use of the repertory grid 
technique (Kelly, 1955) to investigate P–O fit. The repertory grid technique works in the 
following way. First, the subject is asked to list as many factors as possible related to the 
topic, termed elements, under consideration. Then the researcher chooses three elements at 
random and asks the subject to find a pair that are similar and one that is not and explain the 
reason for the similarity and the difference, these reasons are termed constructs. This process 
is repeated with different combinations of the elements until no new constructs emerge. The 
final stage is a two-by-two grid with the subject asked to rate every element against every 
construct. The technique is purported to elicit the unconscious during the comparison of 
elements and during the rating of elements against the constructs. Another method that works 
in a similar fashion is cognitive or causal mapping (Huff, 1990). The protocol for this method 
requires the subject (singly or in a group) to introspect about the issue and write down 
(usually on a large piece of paper) what surfaces. They are then asked to connect the ideas 
together in ways that seem to replicate the felt cognitive and causal links. The researcher then 
prompts the subject to expand and develop the ‘spidergram’ in ways that seem appropriate. It 
works through the principle of spreading activation in which the surfacing of one idea sparks 
another. One of the difficulties of these methods for the current discussion is that they seem 
to work by triggering memory. Whilst they may help researchers surface more factors 
influencing P–O fit and possibly some of the interconnection of ideas, they cannot replicate 
the full complexity of processing in the unconscious brain. However, if they work, they 
should elicit aspects of the person’s P–O fit that they were previously not consciously aware 
of. 
Proposition 13 The factors that a person surfaces when thinking 
about his or her own fit using repertory grid and 
cognitive mapping techniques will include things 
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that the person had previously had no conscious 
awareness of. 
Conclusion 
The focus of this paper has been on the materialist hypothesis to consciousness and the 
implications of this hypothesis for P–O fit. The paper began with a brief overview of the 
main hypotheses to consciousness and a more in-depth consideration of the main hypothesis, 
materialism–epiphenomenalism, shortened to materialism in this paper. In short, this 
hypothesis suggests that there is a one-way transmission from the unconscious brain to the 
conscious mind and that, therefore, consciousness plays no role in shaping the behaviour of 
the individual. The paper then moved on to consider the implications of this hypothesis for P–
O fit. Three aspects of P–O fit were examined. The first of these aspects was the 
underpinning theory to the construct. This was found to be as relevant to a materialist 
hypothesis as it was to a dualist hypothesis, thereby strengthening the interactional approach 
to the determinants of behaviour. The second aspect the paper considered was our 
understanding of what P–O fit is. This was executed by an analysis of the term and its 
redefinition from a materialist position. The materialist hypothesis seems to suggest a move 
away from the integrative definition that is currently in the literature towards one focused on 
the individual’s unconscious assessment of the degree to which (i) the organisation supplies 
the things that have psychological meaning and (ii) they themselves supply the things that the 
organisation requires of them. The final part of the paper considered how a materialist 
hypothesis might affect our methods for capturing P–O fit. It is in this area that the materialist 
hypothesis appears to have the greatest implications for P–O fit suggesting as it does that the 
conscious mind can never achieve a more than a partial, fragmentary effigy of the processes 
in the unconscious brain. The materialist hypothesis, therefore, suggests that the methods we 
have used to date to capture the fit of individual are, at best, incomplete. Instead, the 
hypothesis suggests that researchers adopt techniques that can help them probe the 
unconscious brain, such as repertory grid or cognitive mapping, although even these methods 
also have flaws from the materialist point of view. 
This final observation is worth further discussion as the materialist hypothesis is 
close to suggesting that we may never fully understand P–O fit. The reasons for this are as 
follows. People experience the organisation in many simultaneous ways: as a ‘formal’ 
employer providing a job, remuneration, and conditions of employment; as espoused aims, 
values and published outputs; as the micro-culture of the work unit; as colleagues, as a 
network of people outside that unit; as the line manager; other administrators and 
professionals, and so forth. According to the materialist hypothesis, this phenomenal 
experience of an organisation by an individual is unique and complex, and neither the person 
nor observers can know the unconscious amalgamation of data that generates feelings and 
behaviours inside the brain. Importantly, a person cannot isolate the unconscious effects of 
feelings of fit from the various multiple experiences of the unit such as colleague sociability, 
or fairness of management, although people often speak as if they can. Thus, researchers have 
to be cautious about a person’s stated perceptions of fit, values, beliefs, preferences and so on 
as these are only whatever unconscious processing allows to enter the conscious. This is a 
process that researchers are not close to understanding at the present time. Instead, perhaps 
attentive observation of behaviours, taking into account the uniqueness, complexity and 
dynamism of experience, and the unknowable unconscious processing of the observers, is 
needed to yield useful data on P–O fit. Unfortunately though, the approach of capturing P–O 
fit through observation is made tremendously difficult as the observations of the researcher 
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are mediated through the researcher’s own unconscious brain. Hence, observers need to be 
aware of their own unconscious model of fit in the organisation through which their own 
observation and interpretation is filtered. Which is some trick. 
One of the greatest challenges when considering consciousness matters is the 
intuitiveness of the dualistic paradigm that almost all of us take for granted. Everyday 
language, thinking and perceptions are saturated with dualism, indeed to such an extent that it 
has been necessary to repeat the word ‘conscious’ many times in this document. It is normal 
to speak as if agency means conscious agency, and as if conscious decisions, conscious 
intentions, and conscious judgements are guiding behaviour. In some ways this is remarkable 
given that the bulk of scientific thinking for three hundred years has been based on a 
materialistic and deterministic foundation, and that much of the social sciences lean heavily 
on that framework too. This echoes Nagel (1974: 397) who said, “it may be impossible for us 
to abandon certain ways of conceiving and representing ourselves, no matter how little 
support they get from scientific research”. 
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